Sunday, December 1, 2013

Oh Seung-hwan Will Play In Japan

Relief pitcher Oh Seung-hwan, formally of the Samsung Lions of the Korean Baseball Organization, has decided to play for the Hanshin Tigers of Nippon Professional Baseball (Japan). Seung-hwan was on the Yankees' radar for a bullpen role, but they will have to look elsewhere now.

Seung-hwan finished his career in the Korean Baseball Organization with a record of 28-13, incuding 277 saves, and a 1.69 ERA in 444 games. In the Korean Series this past season, he struck out 8 of the 12 batters he faced in Game 2 (from the 9th to 12th innings), but eventually took the loss after giving up a home run in the 13th inning. Oh went on to save games 3, 5, and 6, as the Lions won the championship.

Seeing as how the KBO is a step below the Japanese pro league, which equates to something like AA ball, I'm not really disappointed. There are many good bullpen options around the league, and even in the Yankees organization, so there's nothing to worry about. That's not to say the Yankees don't need bullpen help, though.

Tomorrow Is The Non Tender Deadline


Tomorrow is the non tender deadline for contracts and the Yankees 40 man roster is currently sitting at 39 players. This list of 39 players does not include Brendan Ryan or Brian McCann so at least one roster move will have to be made tomorrow to make room for one of these men. Who will it be you ask? Here are a few of the options:

Chris Stewart is an obvious non tender candidate if he is not traded before then because he is a catcher and clears a spot for a catcher in McCann. The Yankees have five catchers on the 40 man roster before McCann is added so at least one of them are going to have to go. Both JR Murphy and Austin Romine have minor league options so they could be sent down to AAA to split time but at the same time these men have more trade value then any of the other options. Both Francisco Cervelli and Stewart are out of minor league options and would make suitable backups but Cervelli may be the better option. I know we can designate another young guy for assignment that will clear waivers and accept a AAA assignment but at least one catcher has to go anyway so why not make the move now right?

Depending on what happens with Alex Rodriguez would have a lot to do with the battle between Jayson Nix and Eduardo Nunez. Both are considered utility infielders with Nunez getting the edge with the bat and Nix getting the edge in defense and versatility. The problem is we already have Brendan Ryan signed as a back up player and we only have so many 40 man roster spots. If Alex is suspended then I could see the Yankees letting Nunez start and keeping Nix or signing an Eric Chavez but the problem with this is we won't know what happens with Alex until well after Christmas. If one of these guys got non tendered it would be Nix but right now I don't see either getting the cut just yet. Nix did agree to being sent off the 40 man roster and signed a minor league deal with us last year though so maybe that can happen again.


Matt Daley and David Huff are also on the brink with both being out of minor league options and fringe players. Huff and Daley could either start or go into the bullpen and relieve, one from the left side and one from the right side, and both players are making the league minimum. We could hold onto them now and DFA them later too so no need in making a move unless we absolutely have to so I see them both staying for now.

Ramon Flores is way behind on the organizational depth chart, especially with the emergence of Zoilo Almonte, and would not be a non tender candidate as much as he would be a DFA option. FLores plays primarily left field and hits for zero power and would not be a substantial loss if say we signed a Corey Hart or Carlos Beltran.




Robinson Cano Asks For 9 Years and $252 Million


UPDATE: Robinson Cano, according to Buster Olney, has asked for a nine year deal worth $28 million per season. Cano also asked for a vesting 10th year option worth $29 million. The nine year deal with an AAV of $28 million matches A Rod's first free agent contract handed down by the Texas Rangers at $252 million. Olney also reiterates that the Yankees are in the $170 million range but the good news is now we are only around $80 million apart rather than $100 + million.

So earlier today we learned that Robinson Cano did not ask the Yankees for a 10 year deal or $300 million and now we know exactly what he asked for. Cano asked for a nine year deal worth $250-$260 million in his most recent meeting with the Yankees last week. This comes after the reports that Cano's asking price came down slightly which sounds like it came down from the magic number of $300 million to me.

The Yankees are reportedly sticking to their guns at seven years and $168 million which is a far cry from what Cano is asking for, although closer then if he had asked for $300 million. The Yankees and representatives for Cano are set to meet again on Monday and try to come somewhere in the middle of this $100 million gap they seemingly have.

The Phil Hughes Era Is Officially Over In New York


Wikipedia says so...

Phil Hughes Signs With Twins For Three Years, $24 Mill


Apparently a 4-14 record in the Major Leagues nets you a three year deal in free agency the next time around because that is what Phil Hughes got from the Twins late last night. Target Field should help his home run problem considerably but I cannot see the Twins competing any time soon, even with Hughes and Nolasco, so that may be tough for a guy who is used to the playoff push every season. Should be fun to see the reaction from the crowd the first time he comes back to Yankee Stadium and shuts us down and out with no home runs allowed.

BP: The Strongest And Weakest Roster Cores of 2013


We’ve gotten fairly good at valuing many aspects of major league player performance, commonly through variants of wins above replacement (WARP or WAR). We’ve also been able to show a compelling connection between the sum of a team’s individual player “wins” and actual team wins in the regular-season standings. What we haven’t done sufficiently, in my opinion, is to appreciate the way that the best teams construct their rosters to maintain those accumulated player wins over time. In other words, it would be nice to have a way to measure how successful teams develop and maintain a “core” of winning players.
Quantifying and understanding the quality of a team’s core is important. As we enter the thick of another baseball offseason, the state of a team’s core dictates whether it can rely primarily on players who are already on the active roster to grow and sustain performance, or whether the team instead needs to raid its farm system—such as it may be—or turn to pricey/volatile free agents.
To be sure, many writers express opinions about teams having a winning “core.” But these opinions tend to be ad hoc, and they also tend to focus on individual players without fairly considering the strength of any roster as a whole. Most importantly, since they’re not based on objective criteria, they do not allow apples-to-apples comparisons of the overall core strength between teams.
It is past time that we devised a way to summarize mathematically the extent to which each team, in a given season, is deriving its success from “core” players.
My solution is called “Core Wins,” and it answers what I think is a three-part question. First, we have to decide what it means to make a “core contribution” to a roster, and how to measure, objectively, the contributions made by different types of players. Second, using the recent achievements of the Tampa Bay Rays as a reference, we’ll decide what levels of core player contributions are significant. Finally, we’ll rank all 30 major league clubs by the strength of their player cores as they proceed through this offseason.
Defining Core Contributions
It goes without saying that a “core” contributor is one who provides positive value to the team. That’s the easy part.
But what transforms a merely “good” or “highly useful” player into a “core” contributor involves two additional factors: the amount of control the player’s team has over him, and the age at which the player is currently playing.
Control is the more important factor. A player under team control for multiple years has more “core” value to his team than a departing free agent. Team control can arise either through baseball’s collective bargaining agreement, which generally provides six years of team control over newly-promoted players, and free agency, by which players with more than six years of roster experience sign contracts with teams of their choosing. Once either type of player has been added to the roster, the source of the team’s control is basically irrelevant, and I do not distinguish between them here.
Age is important as well. Younger players get injured less, will probably improve over time, and are cheaper. Older players, by contrast, play fewer games in a season, trend downward in their performance, and are more expensive. But since the main value of youth is in the guaranteed control it provides, and we are already considering control, age should be weighed less heavily than control in evaluating a player’s “core” value, and that’s what I did here.
So, we have three components: (1) Player Performance, (2) Team Control, and (3) Player Age. Here is how I combined them:
Player Performance
Using the metric of Wins Above Replacement Player (WARP), as currently calculated by Baseball Prospectus, I reviewed the performance of every player during the 2013 baseball season who made a positive overall contribution to his major league club. For pitchers, their batting and pitching WARP were summed. Only players posting positive total WARP figures were considered.
Team Control
Player control numbers were drawn primarily from Cot’s Contracts, and cross-checked with Baseball Reference, other sources, and common sense as needed. Control years were weighted the same, regardless of whether they arose from theCBA or a free agent contract. A player subject to a club option was considered to be under club control for that year. The author’s best estimate of remaining club control was necessary in a few cases when contract details were unclear.
To create a weighting factor for team control, I made two years of control—defined by me as being under contract for the 2013 and 2014 seasons—the baseline. That baseline became the denominator in a fraction I call the Control Index, with the numerator being the actual years of control the team had remaining over a player. So, a player in the last year of his contract would have a Control Index of 0.5, and a player subject to four years of team control would have a Control Index of 2.0. For a variety of reasons, I did not consider the impact of more than five years of team control, so the maximum Control Index that could be applied to a player’s 2013 performance was 2.5.
Player Age Component
To account for player age, I used the generally-accepted peak age of 27 as a numerator. My Age Index was comprised of this peak age divided by each player’s so-called baseball age (their age on July 1, 2013) during the 2013 season. So, a player with a baseball age of 27 would have an Age Index of 1.0. In 2013, the youngest positive contributors in baseball were Manny Machado and Jose Fernandez. At a baseball age of 20, both players had an Age Index of 1.35. The oldest player I found was Andy Pettitte at 41. His Age Index was 0.66. Although baseball players do not approach and decline from their peak age at a uniform rate, I didn’t feel that a more targeted approach would produce a significantly better result. (I am willing to share my data with anyone interested in showing otherwise).
For each positive roster contributor in 2013, I multiplied their total WARP times their Age Index times their Control Index. The result of that calculation for each player is the number of Core Wins he produced during the season. I then totaled the Core Wins for each player on each team to allow us to compare teams to each other.
Defining a Strong Roster Core: the Approach of the Tampa Bay Rays
In a pilot study, I did a core win analysis for the 2009–2012 seasons of the Tampa Bay Rays, the New York Mets, and theOakland Athletics. The Rays were of particular interest to me, as their approach over the last several years seems to epitomize a focus on building a strong roster core, as I have defined it, specifically: (1) the acquisition of talented younger players, (2) the signing of the best of those players to team-friendly deals, (3) then further extending or, alternatively, trading those players for new controlled talent. From the 2009 through the 2012 seasons, the Rays averaged 90 team wins (and added 92 more in 2013). And they’ve done it on a shoestring budget.
What does the Core Wins system tell us about how the Rays built their winning rosters? I noticed three things: First, in the aggregate, the Rays racked large numbers of Core Wins each year from 2009 through 2012. Second, the Rays consistently feature a substantial number of what I will call Core Players—players who generated five or more Core Wins during the season. This means that the Rays were getting both breadth and depth from the roster. Third, the Rays averaged at least two pitchers each year among those Core Players.
So, with thanks to the Rays, there you have my formula for what constitutes a strong roster core: (1) a large number of Core Wins; (2) a large number of Core Players (players with five Core Wins or more); and (3) having at least two and preferably more pitchers within that realm of Core Players, to provide stability and a well-rounded roster.
For the time being, I’ve decided to weigh each attribute equally in the Core Roster Rankings I’ve assigned to each team. Having a good core requires star players, including star players who can pitch, and ideally it is paired with enough controllable depth to fill out the rest of the team effectively. It’s certainly possible to succeed with only one or two out of the three, but it isn’t preferable.
Ranking the Major League Rosters
As mentioned above, I ran a Core Wins analysis for every team in baseball. I then ranked them in each of the three categories: (1) the total number of Core Players; (2) the total number of Core Players who were pitchers; and (3) Core Win Differential (the difference between a team’s aggregate Core Wins and underlying WARP, thereby isolating the value of additional player “wins” from “core”-type players). I then averaged each team’s ranking in each category to provide my overall rankings of the best roster cores in baseball.
Figure 1: Best Roster Cores, Ranked
Team
Core Players
Core Pitchers
Pos. CW / Pos. WARP Differential
Core Roster Strength
Cardinals
8
4
58
1
Braves
8
2
47
2
Rockies
6
2
40
3
Indians
6
1
41
4
Rangers
6
2
31
5
Nationals
5
1
41
6
Angels
4
1
48*
7
Pirates
5
1
38
8
Tigers
7
5
24
9
Dodgers
6
3
25
10
Giants
4
1
37
11
Reds
6
1
30
11
Mets
4
2
31
11
Rays
4
1
35
14
Brewers
5
0
37
15
Dbacks
3
1
32
16
Marlins
3
1
32
16
Phillies
3
2
23
18
Mariners
3
1
28
19
White Sox
2
2
26
20
Athletics
3
0
33
20
Orioles
4
0
29
22
Blue Jays
4
0
25
23
Royals
3
0
30
24
Padres
2
1
18
25
Red Sox
3
0
18
26
Cubs
3
0
15
27
Twins
2
0
23
28
Astros
2
0
22
29
Yankees
0
0
-3
30
MEDIAN
4
1
31
It probably doesn’t surprise you that the Cardinals tied for the highest number of Core Players, or that the Tigers have the best pitching core in baseball, or that the quality of the Cardinals’ overall core generally blew everyone else away. Nor is it terribly surprising to learn that the 2013 Yankees were so dilapidated that they were the one team to actually generatenegative core roster quality during the 2013 season. And some of you might have guessed that the runners-up for the pennant in both leagues—the Tigers and Dodgers—have plenty of stars, but a few too many scrubs, as reflected in their low Core Win Differentials.
On the other hand, it may surprise you to see the World Series Champion Red Sox ranking only 26th out of 30 teams in the Core Roster Strength; or that the Rockies ranked third in baseball in core contributions last year; or that the Rays’ roster magic may finally be starting to wear off.
Two Contrasting Cores: the Cardinals and the Red Sox
To show how we got to Figure 1, let’s look at the two teams that met in the World Series, and that brought very different types of rosters to that contest.
We’ll begin with the Cardinals, who through a combination of good drafting, shrewd trades, and some luck have (according to my method, anyway) compiled the best roster core in baseball. Here is an excerpt of the primary players of interest from their chart:
Figure 2: The 2013 Cardinals (excerpt)
Name
Age
WARP
Control Years
Control Index
Age Index
Core Wins
27
7.32
5
2.50
1.00
18
31
5.06
5
2.50
0.87
11
30
4.34
5
2.50
0.90
10
26
3.55
5
2.50
1.04
9
33
3.32
5
2.50
0.82
7
23
2.25
5
2.50
1.17
7
22
2.02
5
2.50
1.23
6
28
2.39
5
2.50
0.96
6
25
1.59
5
2.50
1.08
4
28
1.96
4
2.00
0.96
4
24
1.19
5
2.50
1.13
3
26
1.42
4
2.00
1.04
3
22
0.87
5
2.50
1.23
3
23
0.89
5
2.50
1.17
3
25
0.89
5
2.50
1.08
2
28
0.61
5
2.50
0.96
1
36
3.13
1
0.50
0.75
1
The table shows you my inputs (Age, WARP, Control Years), my Indices (Control and Age), and finally the calculated Core Wins figure for each player. Core Players who are also pitchers have their names italicized in the Name column.
The chart hopefully makes clear how well this Cardinals core performed in 2013. Of their top eight contributors, seven were under club control for five years or more. That adds up to a lot of Core Wins, and helps explain why the Cardinals were able to essentially dominate all three areas of core roster strength. Only Carlos Beltran—their sixth-highest contributor in 2013 by WARP—is a notable departing asset. Because he is both a departing and an aged player, his Control and Age Indices discount an otherwise solid contribution from being anything close to a core one.
The Red Sox represent the flip side. Their roster generated more WARP than any other club in the 2013 regular season. However, a great deal of that production is heading out the door, and the aging remnants should struggle to replace it from within. Here is an excerpt from their calculation chart:
Figure 3: The 2013 Red Sox (excerpt)
Name
Age
WARP
Control Years
Control Index
Age Index
Core Wins
29
4.53
5
2.50
0.93
11
32
5.27
3
1.50
0.84
7
30
2.87
5
2.50
0.90
6
23
1.51
5
2.50
1.17
4
28
1.77
5
2.50
0.96
4
25
1.41
5
2.50
1.08
4
37
4.88
2
1.00
0.73
4
27
1.68
4
2.00
1.00
3
29
2.69
2
1.00
0.93
3
24
0.86
5
2.50
1.13
2
34
1.75
3
1.50
0.79
2
29
4.39
1
0.50
0.93
2
27
1
4
2.00
1.00
2
24
0.7
5
2.50
1.13
2
20
0.52
5
2.50
1.35
2
28
3.38
1
0.50
0.96
2
32
1.71
2
1.00
0.84
1
30
2.89
1
0.50
0.90
1
31
2.73
1
0.50
0.87
1
Last season may have been “do or die” year for the Red Sox. They registered only three Core Players, and none of them was a pitcher. Of their top 10 contributors in 2013, five of them are on the open market. The Core Wins formula discounts the contributions of the departing free agents accordingly, and the Red Sox now face a predicament heading into 2014. With a top-rated farm system and substantial financial resources, they have more ability to replenish than most, but they have a lot of work ahead of them.
The Role of Individual Performances
Before we wrap up, let’s talk about some of the extraordinary individual performances that we saw across the league in 2013, because those performances can be cause for both praise and concern.
Here are the top individual Core Win totals in the 2013 season:
Figure 4: Best Core Players, 2013 Season
Name
Age
WARP
Control Years
Control Index
Age Index
Core Wins
21
10.44
5
2.50
1.29
34
Manny Machado
20
6.01
5
2.50
1.35
20
25
7.49
5
2.50
1.08
20
Matt Carpenter
27
7.32
5
2.50
1.00
18
23
5.55
5
2.50
1.17
16
23
5.41
5
2.50
1.17
16
29
6.73
5
2.50
0.93
16
26
6.03
5
2.50
1.04
16
27
6.23
5
2.50
1.00
16
27
6.19
5
2.50
1.00
15
Congratulations to the teams who invested in these players: by my calculation, these are your ultimate core contributors. These players are under maximum team control and still at or below their likely prime years of production.
To the rosters with fairly robust cores, such as the Cardinals and the Pirates, Matt Carpenter and Andrew McCutchen provide stable, superstar production to complement an otherwise solid collection of players.
But for teams like the Angels, Orioles, and Athletics, the remarkable production of Mike Trout, Manny Machado, and Josh Donaldson is as much a warning as it is an achievement. This is because the remarkable accomplishments of those players cannot be allowed to mask underlying deficiencies in the cores of those rosters. Both the Orioles and the Athletics rank in the bottom half of the league in core roster quality, and Trout singlehandedly comprises one half of the Angels’s entire Core Win Differential, a fact that caused me to put an asterisk next to that figure in Figure 1 above.
Without these well-earned but nonetheless outlying performances, the challenges facing these teams would be even starker. If they truly plan to benefit from the “core” peaks of these stars, they have some work to do in the very near future. And if they are not realistically going to benefit in the near term from these performances, they ought to be asking whether they would benefit more from trades to make their cores stronger as a whole down the road.
Conclusion
The 2013 Red Sox proved that you don’t need a young core to win the World Series, and having a strong core certainly does not guarantee success. Furthermore, a core-worthy performance in one season does not guarantee a core contribution over the long term. Just as in real life, the Core Wins metric discounts players each year, as they get older and presumably closer to free agency. This both raises expectations for individual players and makes any core difficult to sustain over time.
But when analyzing the present day, Core Wins does tell you which teams have the luxury of seeking selective upgrades, as opposed to those that will be relying on the aspirations of new arrivals. In the meantime, as you weigh the “best” signings or long-term direction of a particular club, take into account the current strength of their core. As much as anything, that should tell you where the club’s near-term focus ought to lie.


Being posted as a part of Syndicated Sunday from Baseball Prospectus